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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3066 
___________ 
 
 BETTY A. BEMBRY, 
 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TOWNSHIP OF MULLICA, a Municipal Corporation of the  
 State of New Jersey; BERTHA CAPPUCCIO;  
 KIMBERLY KIRKENDOLL, a/k/a Kimberly Johnson 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-05734) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 14, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 20, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant Betty A. Bembry appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing 
her complaint and denying her motion for reconsideration.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
 In September 2016, Bembry filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, alleging that defendants – the Township of Mullica (“the 
Township”); Bertha Cappuccio, Mullica Township Tax Collector; and Kimberly 
Kirkendoll, municipal clerk – unlawfully obtained a final judgment of foreclosure against 
her property in Elwood, New Jersey.  Specifically, Bembry alleges the following:  In 
December 1985, the Township obtained and then concealed tax sale certificate #85-143 
in the amount of $626.11 against her property.  In 2010, the Township used that tax 
certificate to file a foreclosure complaint in rem against the property in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey.  Bembry claims that she was unaware of the existence of the back 
taxes until the tax collector informed Bembry in November 2010 that a tax foreclosure 
had been filed on her property and that she would have to pay all back taxes.  She 
requested time to pay the taxes, and received a follow-up letter from the Township’s 
attorney informing her that she would have to pay “all back taxes and costs before they 
could do anything.”  She received no further correspondence from the tax collector or the 
Township attorney.  The Superior Court entered final judgment in favor of the Township 
on December 10, 2010, after Bembry failed to answer the complaint.   
 In May and June 2015, Bembry filed motions to stay her eviction in the Superior 
Court, alleging notice deficiencies with respect to the foreclosure judgment and that the 
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Township “deliberately blocked me from paying off back taxes.”  The Superior Court 
denied both motions.  In July and August 2015, Bembry filed motions to vacate the in 
rem foreclosure judgment, alleging that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over 
her because she was never served with the foreclosure complaint, that there were no 
delinquent taxes during the period identified in the tax sale certificate, and that “there was 
fraud in the conduct of the foreclosure.”  The Superior Court denied these motions.  The 
Superior Court also denied Bembry’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, determining 
that her allegations were “vague and unsupported,” and that “[a]lthough [Bembry] 
claimed that the township committed fraud in the underlying action, . . . [she] provided 
no factual or evidential detail in support of this allegation, other than her arguments that 
she was never served with the [sic] in this action, which the Court determined was not 
true.”  (Dkt# 7-7 at 13).  The Appellate Division affirmed, and Bembry was evicted from 
the property on March 23, 2016.  The Superior Court denied Bembry’s subsequent 
motions to vacate and for reconsideration, ordering that no further reconsideration 
motions would be permitted. 
 Bembry then turned to federal court.  She alleged that the defendants violated her 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and 
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by concealing the tax sale certificate and failing to 
notify her of the foreclosure complaint, which allowed defendants to fraudulently obtain 
the foreclosure judgment.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  The District Court 
granted the motion and dismissed Bembry’s complaint, concluding that “the same facts 
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form the basis of her claims both in this Court and in the underlying foreclosure action,” 
D.C. Op. at 7, and the federal claims were therefore barred by New Jersey’s Entire 
Controversy Doctrine.  Bembry sought reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  
Bembry appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order dismissing Bembry’s complaint.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “[W]e accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen 
Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 
361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  We review the District Court’s denial of the motion for 
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. 
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 The Entire Controversy Doctrine, New Jersey’s “idiosyncratic” application of res 
judicata principles provides that a party must bring in one action “all affirmative claims 
that [it] might have against another party, including counterclaims and cross-claims” and 
must join “all parties with a material interest in the controversy,” or “be forever barred 
from bringing a subsequent action involving the same underlying facts.”  Rycoline 
Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 885-86 (3d Cir. 1997) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509, 
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513 (N.J. 1995)).1  The primary consideration in determining if successive claims are part 
of the same controversy is whether the claims “arise from related facts or from the same 
transaction or series of transactions.”  DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995).  
The limits of the entire controversy doctrine with regard to foreclosure actions are 
somewhat narrower, as N.J. Ct. R. 4:64–5 requires that only “germane” counterclaims 
may be joined in a foreclosure action.  See N.J. Ct. R. 4:30A; In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 
215, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The use of the word ‘germane’ in the language of the rule 
undoubtedly was intended to limit counterclaims in foreclosure actions to claims arising 
out of the mortgage transaction which is the subject matter of the foreclosure action.” 
(quoting Leisure Tech.-Ne., Inc. v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 349 A.2d 96, 98 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1975)).   
 We agree with the District Court that the entire controversy doctrine bars 
Bembry’s claims against the defendants.  Even though Bembry’s claims are now styled as 
constitutional or consumer fraud claims, in both the state and federal cases, Bembry has 
argued that the defendants were not entitled to foreclose on her property because they 
failed to provide proper notice and otherwise acted inappropriately with regard to tax 
certificate #85-143.  Bembry could have presented all of these claims and defenses in 
state court in the initial foreclosure action and actually did present them, multiple times 
                                              
1 We note that the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that New Jersey’s entire controversy 
doctrine did not apply to claims being heard in a federal district court sitting in California 
because “New Jersey law does not require extrajurisdictional application of its entire 
controversy doctrine.”  Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1254 (9th 
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and without success, in her motions to stay foreclosure, to vacate the judgment of 
foreclosure, and for reconsideration.  As a result, her federal claims are barred by the 
entire controversy doctrine.  See generally Delacruz v. Alfieri, 145 A.3d 695, 708 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (“Claims or defenses that went to the validity of the 
mortgage, the amount due, or the right of [mortgagee] to foreclose had to be raised in the 
foreclosure proceeding or they were barred.”).2 
 Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bembry’s motion 
for reconsideration because she did not establish any bases for reconsideration.  See 
Max’s Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Cir. 2017).  However, we are bound by our contrary precedent.  See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1. 
2 On appeal, Bembry appears to claim that her “complaint alleged sufficient facts from 
which a continuing tort could reasonably be inferred,” but she did not raise this theory 
before the District Court, and cannot now do so for the first time on appeal.  See Birdman 
v. Office of the Governor, 677 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 2012). 
